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Abstract
In this paper, we show that the protocol complex of a Byzantine synchronous system can
remain (k− 1)-connected for up to ⌈t/k⌉ rounds, where t is the maximum number of Byzantine
processes, and t ≥ k ≥ 1. This topological property implies that ⌈t/k⌉+1 rounds are necessary
to solve k-set agreement in Byzantine synchronous systems, compared to ⌊t/k⌋ + 1 rounds in
synchronous crash-failure systems. We also show that our connectivity bound is tight as we
indicate solutions to Byzantine k-set agreement in exactly ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 synchronous rounds, at
least when n is suitably large compared to t. In conclusion, we see how Byzantine failures can
potentially require one extra round to solve k-set agreement, and, for n suitably large compared
to t, at most that.
1 Introduction
A task is a distributed coordination problem where multiple processes start with private inputs,
communicate among themselves (by shared memory or message passing), and halt with outputs
consistent with the task specification. There are crash-failure systems [1], where processes can fail
only by permanent, unannounced halting, or Byzantine-failure systems [18], where processes can
fail arbitrarily, even maliciously. In synchronous systems, communication and computation are
organized in discrete rounds. In each round, each non-faulty process performs as follows, in order:
(i) sends a message; (ii) receives all messages sent in the current round by the other processes; and
(iii) performs internal computation. In asynchronous systems, processes may have different relative
speeds, and communication is subject to unbound, finite delays.
The problem of consensus in the synchronous Byzantine message-passing model was among
the earliest to be investigated, and upper and lower consensus bounds in that model are well-
understood. In this paper, we turn our attention to overall computational power of this model,
including bounds for problems such as k-set agreement. We use concepts and techniques adapted
from combinatorial topology. In essence, we can capture all possible information dissemination
patterns permitted by this model in a single combinatorial structure called a simplicial complex (or
just complex ). A classical topological property of a simplicial complex is its level of connectivity,
which is, roughly speaking, the dimension below which it has no holes. Many classical proofs
of consensus impossibility can be reformulated as showing that certain complexes are 0-connected
(also called path-connected), and all known impossibility proofs for k-set agreement rely on showing
that certain complexes are (k−1)-connected. Very informally, the higher the degree of connectivity
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imposed by the adversary, the weaker the model’s computational power. Here, we present the first
tight bounds on connectivity for the synchronous Byzantine message-passing model.
Prior work using topological techniques is discussed in Sec. 2. Our operational setting is detailed
in Sec. 3, and our topological model is formalized in Sec. 4.
Our first contribution comes in Sec. 5. We show that, in a Byzantine synchronous system, the
protocol complex can remain (k− 1)-connected for ⌈t/k⌉ rounds, where t is an upper bound on the
number of Byzantine processes. Perhaps surprisingly, this is only one more round than the upper
bound for crash-failure systems (⌊t/k⌋, shown in [8]). Technically, we conceive a combinatorial
operator modeling the ability of Byzantine processes to equivocate – that is, to transmit ambiguous
state information – without revealing their Byzantine nature. We compose this operator with
regular crash-failure operators, extending the protocol complex connectivity for one extra round. As
noted, connectivity is of interest because a (k− 1)-connected protocol complex prevents important
problems such as k-set agreement [7, 9] from having solutions.
Our second contribution comes in Sec. 6. We show that the above connectivity bound is tight
in certain settings (described in Sec. 6), by solving k-set agreement in ⌈t/k⌉+ 1 rounds. We do so
with a full-information protocol that assumes n suitably large compared to t. The protocol suits
well our purpose of tightening the ⌈t/k⌉ bound, and also exposes clearly the reason why ⌈t/k⌉+ 1
rounds is enough to solve k-set agreement.
These results give new insight into the power of Byzantine adversaries for problems beyond
consensus. Although Byzantine adversaries seem much more powerful than crash-failure ones, we
show that a Byzantine adversary can impose at most one additional synchronous round beyond that
imposed by a crash-failure adversary. In terms of solvability vs. number of rounds, the penalty for
moving from crash to Byzantine failures, captured by (k− 1)-connectivity in the protocol complex,
can be quite limited in synchronous systems, particularly when n is relatively large compared to t.
2 Related Work
The Byzantine failure model was initially introduced by Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [18]. The
use of simplicial complexes to model distributed computations was introduced by Herlihy and
Shavit [15]. The asynchronous computability theorem for general tasks in [16] details the ap-
proach for asynchronous wait-free computation in the crash-failure model. This model was recently
generalized by Gafni, Kuznetsov, and Manolescu [10]. Computability in Byzantine asynchronous
systems, where tasks are constrained in terms of non-faulty inputs, was recently considered in [19].
The k-set agreement problem was originally defined by Chaudhuri [7]. Alternative formula-
tions with different validity notions, or failure/communication settings, are discussed in [22, 9]. A
full characterization of optimal translations between different failure settings is given in [2, 23],
which requires different number of rounds depending on the relation between the number of faulty
processes, and the number of participating processes.
The relationship between connectivity and the impossibility of k-set agreement is described
explicitly or implicitly in [8, 16, 24]. Recent work by Castaeda, Gonczarowski, and Moses [6]
considers an issue of chains of hidden values, a concept loosely explored here. The approach based
on shellability and layered executions for lower bounds in connectivity has been used by Herlihy,
Rajsbaum, and Tuttle [14, 13, 12], assuming crash-failure systems, synchronous or asynchronous.
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3 Operational Model
We have n+1 processes1 P = {P0, . . . , Pn} communicating by message-passing via pairwise, reliable,
FIFO channels (authenticated channels in the literature [5]). Technically, all transmitted messages
are delivered uniquely, in FIFO order, and with sender reliably identified.
At most t processes are faulty or Byzantine [18], and may display arbitrary, even malicious
behavior, at any point in the execution. The actual behavior of Byzantine processes is defined
by an adversary. Byzantine processes may execute the protocol correctly or incorrectly, at the
discretion of the adversary. Processes behaving in strict accordance to the protocol for rounds 1
up to some r (inclusive) are called non-faulty processes up to round r, and are denoted by Gr. A
non-faulty process up to any round r ≥ 1 is called simply non-faulty or correct, which we denote
by G.
We model processes as state machines. The input value (resp. output value) of a non-faulty
process Pi is written Ii (resp. Oi). Byzantine processes may have “apparent” inputs, denoted as
above. Each non-faulty process Pi has an internal state called view, which we denote by view(Pi).
In the beginning of the protocol, view(Pi) is Ii. At any round r, any non-faulty process: (1) sends
its internal state to all other processes; (2) receives the state information from other processes;
(3) concatenates that information to its own internal state. After completing some number of
iterations, each process applies a decision function δ to its current state in order to decide Oi.
Thus, we assume that processes follow a full-information protocol [13].
For simplicity of notation, we define a round 0 where processes are simply assigned their inputs.
Without losing generality, all processes are assumed non-faulty up to round 0: G0 = P and B0 = ∅.
For any round r ≥ 0, a global state formally specifies: (1) the non-faulty processes up to round r;
and (2) the view of all non-faulty processes up to round r.
4 Topological Model
We now sketch the required concepts from combinatorial topology. For details, please refer to
Munkres [20], Kozlov [17], or Herlihy et al. [11].
Basics. A simplicial complex K consists of a finite set V along with a collection of subsets of
V closed under containment. An element of V is called a vertex of K. The set of vertices of K is
referred by V (K). Each set in K is called a simplex, usually denoted by lower-case Greek letters:
σ, τ , etc. The dimension dim(σ) of a simplex σ is |σ| − 1.
A subset of a simplex is called a face. The collection of faces of σ with dimension exactly x is
called Facesx(σ). A face τ of σ is called proper if dim(τ) = dim(σ) − 1. We use “k-simplex” as
shorthand for “k-dimensional simplex”, also in “k-face.” The dimension dim(K) of a complex is
the maximal dimension of its simplexes, and a facet of K is any simplex having maximal dimension
in K. A complex is said pure if all facets have dimension dim(K). The set of simplexes of K having
dimension at most ℓ is a subcomplex of K, which is called ℓ-skeleton of K, denoted by skelℓ(K).
Maps. Let K and L be complexes. A vertex map f carries vertices of K to vertices of L. If f
additionally carries simplexes of K to simplexes of L, it is called a simplicial map. A carrier map
Φ from K to L takes each simplex σ ∈ K to a subcomplex Φ(σ) ⊆ L, such that for all σ, τ ∈ K, we
1 Choosing n+1 processes rather than n simplifies the topological notation, but slightly complicates the computing
notation. Choosing n processes has the opposite trade-off. We choose n+ 1 for compatibility with prior work.
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have Φ(σ∩ τ) ⊆ Φ(σ)∩Φ(τ). A simplicial map φ : K → L is carried by the carrier map Φ : K → 2L
if, for every simplex σ ∈ K, we have φ(σ) ⊆ Φ(σ).
Although we defined simplexes and complexes in a purely combinatorial way, they can also be
interpreted geometrically. An n-simplex can be identified with the convex hull of (n + 1) affinely-
independent points in the Euclidean space of appropriate dimension. This geometric realization
can be extended to complexes. The point-set that underlies such geometric complex K is called the
polyhedron of K, denoted by |K|. For any simplex σ, the boundary of σ, which we denote ∂ σ, is
the simplicial complex of (dim(σ)− 1)-faces of σ. The interior of σ is defined as Intσ = |σ| \ | ∂ σ|.
We can define simplicial/carrier maps between geometrical complexes. Given a simplicial map
φ : K → L (resp. carrier map Φ : K → 2L), the polyhedrons of every simplex in K and L induce a
continuous simplicial map φc : |K| → |L| (resp. continuous carrier map Φc : |K| → |2
L|). We say φ
(resp. φc) is carried by Φ if, for any σ ∈ K, we have |φ(σ)| ⊆ |Φ(σ)| (resp. φc(|σ|) ⊆ Φc(|σ|)).
Connectivity. In light of topology, two geometrical objects A and B are homeomorphic if,
there is a continuous map from A into B or vice-versa. Technically, there exists a continuous
map between those objects, in either direction [21, 20]. We say that a simplicial complex K is
x-connected, x ≥ 0, if every continuous map of a subset of |K| homeomorphic to an x-sphere in |K|
can be extended into a subset of |K| homeomorphic to an (x+ 1)-disk in |K|. In analogy, think of
the extremes of a pencil as a 0-disk, and the pencil itself as a 1-sphere (the extension is possible if
0-connected); the rim of a coin as a 1-sphere, and the coin itself as a 2-disk (the extension is possible
if 1-connected); the outer layer of a billiard ball as a 2-sphere, and the billiard ball itself as a 3-disk
(the extension is possible if 2-connected). For us, (−1)-connected is understood as non-empty, and
(−2)-connected or lower imposes no restriction.
Definition 4.1. Let S = {(Pi, Si) : Pi ∈ P
′}, where each Si is an arbitrary set and P
′ ⊆ P. A
pseudosphere Ψ(P′,S) is a simplicial complex where σ ∈ Ψ(P′,S) if σ = {(Pi, Vi) : Pi ∈ P
′, Vi ∈ Si}.
Essentially, a pseudosphere is a simplicial complex formed by independently assigning values to
all the specified processes. If Si = S for all Pi ∈ P
′, we simply write Ψ(P′, S).
Definition 4.2. A pure, simplicial complex K is shellable if we can arrange the facets of K in a linear
order φ0 . . . , φt such that
(⋃
0≤i<k φi
)
∩ φk is a pure (dim(φk)− 1)-dimensional simplicial complex
for all 0 < k ≤ t. We call the above linear order φ0, . . . , φt a shelling order.
Intuitively, a simplicial complex is shellable if it can be built by gluing its x-simplexes along
their (x− 1) faces only, where x is the dimension of the complex. Note that φ0, . . . , φt is a shelling
order if any φi ∩ φj (0 ≤ i < j ≤ t) is contained in a (dim(φk)− 1)-face of φk (0 ≤ k < j). Hence,
for any i < j exists k < j where (φi ∩ φj) ⊆ (φk ∩ φj) and |φj \ φk| = 1. (1)
Shellability and pseudospheres are important tools to characterize connectivity in simplicial com-
plexes. The following lemmas are proved in [12] and [11] (pp. 252–253).
Lemma 4.3. Any pseudosphere φ(P′,S) is shellable, considering arbitrary S = {(Pi, Si) : ∀Pi ∈ P
′}.
Lemma 4.4. For any k ≥ 1, if the simplicial complex K is shellable and dim(K) ≥ k then K is
(k − 1)-connected.
Nerve Theorem. Let K be a simplicial complex with a cover {Ki : i ∈ I} = K, where I is a
finite index set. The nerve N ({Ki : i ∈ I}) is the simplicial complex with vertexes I and simplexes
J ⊆ I whenever KJ =
⋂
j∈J Kj 6= ∅. We can characterize the connectivity of K in terms of the
connectivity of the intuitively simpler nerve of K with the next theorem.
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Theorem 4.5 (Nerve Theorem [17, 3]). If for any J ⊆ I denoting a simplex of N ({Ki : i ∈ I})
(thus, KJ 6= ∅) we have that KJ is (k − |J | + 1)-connected, then K is k-connected if and only if
N ({Ki : i ∈ I}) is k-connected.
Protocol Complexes. We represent the evolution of the global state of the system throughout
the rounds by simplicial complexes that we call protocol complexes.
Definition 4.6. For r ≥ 0, a name-view simplex σ is such that: (i) σ = {(Pi, view
r(Pi)) : ∀Pi ∈ G
r},
where viewr(Pi) denotes Pi’s view at round r; and (ii) if (Pi, view
r(Pi)) and (Pj , view
r(Pj)) are
both in σ, then Pi 6= Pj .
Unless otherwise noted, all of our simplicial and carrier maps f are such that names(σ) =
names(f(σ)), that is, they map between vertices associated with the same processes.
Definition 4.7. For any name-view simplex σ, define names(σ) = {Pi : ∃V such that (Pi, V ) ∈ σ}
and views(σ) = {Vi : ∃P such that (P, Vi) ∈ σ}.
The round-0 protocol complex K0 has name-view n-simplexes σI = {(Pi, Ii) : ∀Pi ∈ G
0},
representing all the possible process inputs in the beginning of the protocol. The round-r protocol
complex Kr, for any r ≥ 0, is defined as follows: if σ ∈ Kr, then σ = {(Pi, view
r(Pi)) : ∀Pi ∈ G
r},
representing a possible global state of the system for round r.
5 Connectivity Upper Bound
Informally, if the adversary displays Byzantine behavior early in the execution, then in a syn-
chronous, full-information protocol, subsequent communication among the non-faulty processes can
reveal the identities of the Byzantine processes, using simple techniques inspired from [2, 4, 25].
Instead, it behooves the adversary to postpone malicious behavior to the very last round, where it
cannot detected.
Say that non-faulty processes start the computation with inputs in V = {v0, . . . , vd}, arbitrarily
assigned, with some d ≥ k and t ≥ k ≥ 1. To prove our upper bound, we show how the adversary can
impose a particular admissible execution that preserves high connectivity in the protocol complex.
Let r = ⌊t/k⌋ and m = t mod k. We have r crash rounds, where in each round k processes
fail by crashing, but display no Byzantine behavior. If m > 0, we have an extra equivocation
round, where a single Byzantine process sends different views to different processes, causing extra
confusion. This round-by-round execution produces a sequence of protocol complexes K0, . . . ,Kr+1,
related by carrier maps Ci : Ki−1 → 2K
i
, for 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and E : Kr → 2K
r+1
.
K0 C1−−−−→K
1 . . . Cr−−−−→K
r E−−−→K
r+1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
only if m > 0
. (2)
In each of the first r rounds, exactly k processes are failed by the adversary. The crash-failure
carrier maps are defined as follows [12, 11]:
Definition 5.1. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the crash-failure operator Ci : Ki−1 → 2K
i
is such that
Ci(σ) =
⋃
τ∈Facesn−ik(σ)
Ψ(names(τ); [τ : σ]) (3)
for any σ ∈ Ki−1, with [τ : σ] denoting the set of simplexes µ where τ ⊆ µ ⊆ σ.
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Definition 5.2. A q-connected carrier map Φ : K → 2L is a strict carrier map such that, for all
σ ∈ K, dim(Φ(σ)) > q − codimK(σ) and Φ(σ) is (q − codimK(σ))-connected.
Definition 5.3. A q-shellable carrier map Φ : K → 2L is a strict carrier map such that, for all σ ∈ K,
dim(Φ(σ)) > q − codimK(σ) and Φ(σ) is shellable.
After r rounds, note that Kr only contains simplexes with dimension exactly n−rk. In [12, 11],
the following lemmas are proved:
Lemma 5.4. For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, the operator Ci : Ki−1 → 2K
i
is a (k − 1)-shellable carrier map.
Lemma 5.5. If M1, . . . ,Mx are all q-shellable carrier maps, and Mx+1 is a q-connected carrier
map, the composition M1 ◦ . . .Mx ◦Mx+1 is a q-connected carrier map, for any x ≥ 0.
Equivocation and Interpretation. After the crash-failure rounds, if m > 0 the adversary
picks one of the remaining processes to behave maliciously at round r + 1. This process, say
Pb, may send different views to different processes (which is technically called equivocation), but,
informally speaking, all views are “plausible.” For example, two non-faulty processes Pi and Pj
could be indecisive after round r on whether the global state is σ1 or σ2 in K
r, while Pb, a Byzantine
process, sends a state corresponding to σ1 to Pi, and a state corresponding to σ2 to Pj. The faulty
process Pb does not reveal its Byzantine nature, yet it promotes ambiguity in the state information
diffusion.
At the final round, when a non-faulty process receives the states sent from the other processes,
it must decide correctly even if one other process equivocates. If the non-faulty process can receive
simplexes σ1 and σ2, representing global states that differ in only one process’s contribution (that
is, dim(σ1∩σ2) = n−rk−1), then the interpretation of a message containing one such state must be
the same as a message containing the other. We capture this notion using the equivocation operator,
called E , describing the behavior of a Byzantine process, coupled with an interpretation operator,
called Interp, describing the required behavior of non-faulty processes. Informally, Interp(σ1) =
Interp(σ2) for processes in names(τ), where τ = σ1 ∩ σ2 with dim(τ) = n− rk − 1. Formally:
Definition 5.6. For any simplexes σ1 and σ2 in K, with dim(K) = n − rk, let (Pi, Interp(σ1)) =
(Pi, Interp(σ2)) if and only if σ1 = σ2; or Pi ∈ names(τ) where τ = σ1∩σ2 and dim(τ) = n−rk−1.
Definition 5.7. For any pure simplicial complexes K and L with dim(K) ≤ n− rk and K ⊇ L, the
K-equivocation operator EK is
EK(L) =
⋃
τ∈Facesn−rk−1(L)
Ψ(names(τ); {Interp(σ∗) : σ∗ ∈ K, σ∗ ⊃ τ})). (4)
Note that EK(L) = ∅ whenever dim(L) < n− rk − 1 or dim(K) < n− rk, and also that
EK(σ) =
⋃
τ∈Facesn−rk−1(σ)
Ψ(names(τ); Interp(σ)) (5)
for any σ ∈ K with dim(σ) = n− rk. For convenience of notation, define EK(K) = E(K).
Next, we investigate some technical properties of these constructions that allow us to prove that
the final complex is (k − 1)-connected.
Lemma 5.8. For any pure, shellable simplicial complex with dim(K) ≤ n− rk, the K-equivocation
operator EK is a carrier map.
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Proof. Let τ ⊆ σ ∈ K. We show that EK(τ) ⊆ EK(σ). If dim(τ) < n − rk − 1 then EK(τ) = ∅ and
EK(τ) ⊆ EK(σ) for any σ ⊇ τ ∈ K. Otherwise, if dim(τ) = dim(σ) then τ = σ and EK(τ) = EK(σ),
as we assumed that σ ⊇ τ ∈ K. The remaining case is when dim(τ) = n−rk−1 and dim(σ) = n−rk,
which makes EK(τ) ⊆ EK(σ) in light of Definition 5.7.
Let (Cr ◦E) be the composite map such that (Cr ◦E)(σ) = ECr(σ)(C
r(σ)). While, for an arbitrary
complex K, EK is not a strict carrier map per se, we show in the following lemmas that (C
r ◦ E)
is a (k − 1)-connected carrier map. Lemma 5.9 shows that (Cr ◦ E) is a strict carrier map, and
Lemma 5.10 shows that for any σ ∈ Kr−1, (Cr ◦ E)(σ) is ((k − 1)− codimKr−1(σ))-connected.
Lemma 5.9. (Cr ◦ E) is a strict carrier map.
Proof. Consider σ, τ ∈ Kr−1, with L = Cr(σ) and M = Cr(τ). Both L and M are pure, shellable
simplicial complexes with dimension n − rk (Definition 5.1 and Lemma 5.4). Therefore, both the
L-equivocation and M-equivocation operators are well-defined. Also, Cr is a strict carrier map,
hence L ∩M = Cr(σ) ∩ Cr(τ) = Cr(σ ∩ τ). Note that L ∩M = Cr(σ ∩ τ), if not empty, is a pure,
shellable simplicial complex with dimension n− rk. Therefore, the (L∩M)-equivocation operator
is well-defined.
First, we show that E(L) ∩ E(M) ⊆ E(L ∩M), which implies one direction of our equality:
E(Cr(σ)) ∩ E(Cr(τ)) ⊆ E(Cr(σ) ∩ Cr(τ)) = E(Cr(σ ∩ τ)).
For clarity, let F (K) = Facesn−rk−1(K). Then,
E(L) ∩ E(M) =
⋃
µ∈F (L)
EL(µ) ∩
⋃
ν∈F (M)
EM(ν) =
⋃
µ∈F (L)
ν∈F (M)
EL(µ) ∩ EM(ν).
For arbitrary µ ∈ F (L) and ν ∈ F (M), if EL(µ) ∩ EM(ν) 6= ∅, consider two cases:
1. µ and ν are proper faces of φ ∈ (L ∩M). In this case,
EL(µ) ∩ EM(ν) = Ψ(names(µ) ∩ names(ν); Interp(φ)),
which is inside EL∩M(φ) ⊆ EL∩M(L ∩M).
2. Otherwise, µ ⊂ φ1 ∈ L or ν ⊂ φ2 ∈ M. In this case,
EL(µ) ∩ EM(ν) = Ψ(names(µ) ∩ names(ν); Interp(φ1) ∩ Interp(φ2)).
By Definition 5.6, the above is non-empty only when Interp(φ1) = Interp(α) with α ∈ L,
Interp(φ2) = Interp(β) with β ∈ M, and there exists a non-empty set P
′ such that P′ ⊆
names(µ) ∩ names(ν) ⊆ names(γ), where γ = α ∩ β with dim(γ) = n − rk − 1. Let P′′ be a
maximal P′ satisfying such condition. Note that γ ∈ (L ∩M), so (L ∩M) 6= ∅.
Since (L ∩M) is non-empty, it is pure, shellable with dimension n − rk, there must exist a
simplex γ′ ⊃ γ with dimension n − rk. Moreover, Interp(γ′) = Interp(α) = Interp(φ1) and
Interp(γ′) = Interp(β) = Interp(φ2) for processes in names(γ), given the definition of Interp.
In conclusion, we have EL(µ) ∩ EM(ν) = Ψ(P
′′; Interp(γ′)) ⊆ Ψ(names(γ); Interp(γ′)), which
is inside EL∩M(γ
′) ⊆ EL∩M(L ∩M).
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In the other direction, we have E(L∩M)
def
= EL∩M(L∩M) ⊆ EL(L∩M) ⊆ EL(L)
def
= E(L), since
(i) EL∩M(X ) ⊆ EL(X ) for any X ⊆ L∩M (Definition 5.7); and (ii) EL is a carrier map (Lemma 5.8).
The same argument proves that E(L ∩M) ⊆ E(M), and therefore E(L ∩M) ⊆ E(L) ∩ E(M).
Lemma 5.10. For any σ ∈ Kr−1, E(Cr(σ)) is ((k − 1)− codimKr−1(σ))-connected.
Proof. Consider σ ∈ Kr−1 with codimKr−1(σ) ≤ k. By Lemma 5.4, M = C
r(σ) is a pure, shellable
simplicial complex with dim(M) = n − rk = d. By Definition 5.7, E(M) is well-defined and
dim(E(M)) = n− rk − 1 = d′. Note that d′ ≥ n− t ≥ 2t ≥ 2k, since n+ 1 > 3t and t ≥ k.
First, we show that E(M) is “highly-connected” – that is, (2k − 1)-connected. We proceed by
induction on µ0 . . . µℓ, a shelling order of facets of M.
Base. We show that EM(µ0) is (2k − 1)-connected. Considering Definition 5.7, we have that
EM(µ0) = EM(τ0) ∪ . . . ∪ EM(τd), with τ0 . . . τd being all the proper faces of µ0.
Consider the cover {EM(τi) : 0 ≤ i ≤ d} of EM(µ0), and its associated nerve N ({EM(τi) : 0 ≤
i ≤ d}). For any index set J ⊆ I = {0 . . . d}, let
KJ =
⋂
j∈J
EM(τj) = Ψ(
⋂
j∈J
names(τj); Interp(µ0))
For any J with |J | ≤ d, we have ∩j∈J names(τj) 6= ∅, making KJ a non-empty pseudosphere
with dimension d′−|J |+1 ≥ 2k−|J |+1. So, KJ is ((2k−1)−|J |+1)-connected by Lemmas 4.3
and 4.4. The nerve is hence the (d− 1)-skeleton of I, which is (d− 2) = (d′ − 1) ≥ (2k − 1)-
connected. By the Nerve Theorem, EM(µ0) is also (2k − 1)-connected.
IH. Assume that Y = ∪0≤y<xEM(µy) is (2k − 1) connected, and let X = EM(µx). We must show
that Y ∪ X = ∪0≤y≤xE(µy) is (2k − 1)-connected. Note that X is (2k − 1)-connected by an
argument identical to the one above for the base case EM(µ0). Besides,
Y ∩ X =

 ⋃
0≤y<x
EM(µy)

 ∩ EM(µx) =
⋃
0≤y<x
(EM(µy) ∩ EM(µx))
⋆
=
⋃
i∈S
EM(τi),
where i ∈ S is such that (∪0≤y<x µy) ∩ µx = ∪i∈S τi. The set S is well-defined since M is
shellable. The step (⋆) holds because: (i) Y ∩ X must include at least
⋃
i∈S EM(τi); and (ii)
EM(µy) ∩ EM(µx) 6= ∅ only if ψ = Ψ(names(µy ∩ µx); Interp(µx)) exists, the latter inside
ψ′ = Ψ(names(τj); Interp(µx)) for some j ∈ S, or we contradict the fact that M is shellable.
Using an argument identical to the one for EM(µ0), yet considering the cover {EM(τi) : i ∈ S},
the nerve of X ∩ Y is either the (d − 1)-skeleton of S (if S = {0 . . . d}) or the whole simplex
S (otherwise). By the Nerve Theorem, ∪i∈SEM(τi) is (2k − 1)-connected.
Once again, using the Nerve Theorem, since Y is (2k−1)-connected, X is (2k−1)-connected,
and Y ∩ X is (2k − 1)-connected, we have that Y ∪ X is (2k − 1)-connected.
While the equivocation operator yields high connectivity (2k − 1) in the pseudosphere Cr(σ), the
composition of Cr and ECr(σ)(C
r(σ)) limits the connectivity to (k− 1), since the former map is only
defined for simplexes with codimension ≤ k. Formally, as Cr(σ) 6= ∅ for any simplex σ ∈ Kr−1 with
codimKr−1(σ) ≤ k, we have that E(C
r(σ)) is ((k − 1)− codimKr−1(σ))-connected.
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From Lemmas 5.9 and 5.10, we conclude the following.
Corollary 5.11. (Cr ◦ E) is a (k − 1)-connected carrier map.
Theorem 5.12. An adversary can keep the protocol complex of a Byzantine synchronous system
(k − 1)-connected for ⌈t/k⌉ rounds.
Proof. If m = 0, t mod k = 0, and the adversary runs only the crash rounds failing k processes
each time, for r = ⌊t/k⌋ = ⌈t/k⌉ consecutive rounds. We have the following scenario:
(C1 ◦ . . . ◦ Cr)(σ).
Since Ci : Ki−1 → 2K
i
is a (k−1)-shellable carrier map for 1 ≤ i ≤ r (Lemma 5.4), the composition
(C1 ◦ . . . ◦ Cr) is a (k − 1)-connected carrier map for any facet σ ∈ I (Lemma 5.5).
If m > 0, the adversary performs r crash rounds (failing k processes each time), followed by the
extra equivocation round. We have the following scenario:
(C1 ◦ . . . ◦ Cr−1 ◦ (Cr ◦ E))(σ). (6)
Since Ci : Ki−1 → Ki is a (k − 1)-shellable carrier map for 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 (Lemma 5.4), and
(Cr ◦ E) is a (k − 1)-connected carrier map (Corollary 5.11), we have that the composition above
(C1 ◦ . . . ◦ Cr−1 ◦ (Cr ◦ E)) is a (k − 1)-connected carrier map for any facet σ ∈ I (Lemma 5.5).
6 k-Set Agreement and Lower Bound
The k-set agreement problem and connectivity are closely related. Lemma 6.1, proved in Ap-
pendix A, shows that no solution is possible for k-set agreement with a (k − 1)-connected protocol
complex, which, as seen in Sec. 5, can occur at least until round ⌈t/k⌉.
Lemma 6.1. If, starting σ ∈ I, the protocol complex P(σ) is (k − 1)-connected, then no decision
function δ solves the k-set agreement problem.
We now present a simple k-set agreement algorithm for Byzantine synchronous systems, running
in ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 rounds. The procedure requires a relatively large number of processes compared to
t: we assume n + 1 ≥ k(3t + 1). The procedure was designed with the purpose of tightening the
connectivity lower bound, favoring simplicity over the optimality on the number of processes.
Non-faulty processes initially execute a gossip phase for ⌈t/k⌉+1 rounds, followed by a validation
phase, and a decision phase, where the output is chosen. Define R = ⌈t/k⌉, and consider the
following tree, where nodes are labeled with words over the alphabet P. The root node is labeled
as λ, which represents an empty string. Each node w such that 0 ≤ |w| ≤ R has n+ 1 child nodes
labeled wp for all p ∈ P. Any non-faulty process Pi maintains such tree, denoted Ti.
All nodes w are associated with the value Contp(w), called the contents of w. The special value
⊥ represents an absent input. We omit the subscript p when the process is implied or arbitrary.
We divide the processes into k disjoint groups: P(g) = {Px ∈ P : x = g mod k}, for 0 ≤ g < k. For
any tree T , we call T (g) the subtree of T having only nodes wp ∈ T such that p ∈ P(g).
In the validation phase, if we have a set Q containing (n + 1) − t processes that acknowledge
all messages transmitted by process p (making sure that p ∈ Q), at every round 1 ≤ r ≤ R, we call
such set the quorum of p, denoted Quorum(p). Formally, Quorum(p) = Q ⊆ P such that p ∈ Q,
|Q| ≥ (n + 1) − t, and q ∈ Q whenever Cont(wp) = v implies Cont(wpq) = v, for any wp with
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Algorithm 1 Px.Agree(I)
1: if k = 1 then
2: return Decision(Multiset(Cont(p) : p output by consensus algorithm))
3: Cont(w)← ⊥ for all w ∈ T
4: Cont(λ)← I ⊲ Gossip
5: for ℓ : 1 to ⌈t/k⌉+ 1 do
6: send(Sℓ−1x = {(w,Cont(w)) : |w| = ℓ− 1})
7: upon recv(Sℓ−1y = {(w, v) : |w| = ℓ− 1, v ∈ V ∪ {⊥}}) from Py do
8: Cont(wPy)← v for all (w, v) ∈ S
ℓ−1
y
9:
10: P′ ← {Pi : Pi has a quorum} ⊲ Validation
11: if |P′| = (n+ 1)− t then
12: Apply completion rule for all wb where b ∈ P \ P′ and |wb| = ⌈t/k⌉
13: g ← any g such that T (g) is pivotal ⊲ Decision
14: for ℓ : ⌈t/k⌉ − 1 to 1 do
15: Apply consensus rule for all non-validated wb where b ∈ P(g) and |wb| = ℓ
16: return Decision(Multiset(Cont(p) : p ∈ T (g)))
0 ≤ |wp| ≤ R. It should be clear that every non-faulty process has a quorum containing at least
all other non-faulty processes. If a process p has a quorum as seen by process Pi ∈ G, we say that
wp has been validated on Pi, for any wp with 0 ≤ |wp| < R (and that p has been validated on Pi).
Note that in our definition either all entries wp for p ∈ P are validated, or none is. Lemma 6.2,
proven in Appendix B, shows that validated entries are unique across non-faulty processes.
Lemma 6.2. If p has been validated on non-faulty processes Pi and Pj , then Conti(wp) = Contj(wp)
for any 0 ≤ |w| < R.
In the decision phase, if we see t processes without a quorum, we have technically identified all
non-faulty processes B. In this case, we fill R-th round values of any b ∈ B using the completion
rule: we make Cont(wb) = v if we have (n+1)− 2t processes G′ ⊆ G where Cont(wbg) = v for any
g ∈ G′ and |wb| = R. If a process b has its R-round values completed as above in process Pi ∈ G,
we say that wb has been completed on Pi for any |wb| = R. Lemma 6.3, proven in Appendix B,
shows that completed entries are identical and consistent with validated entries across non-faulty
processes. (Intuitively, the completion rule was done over identical values from correct processes.)
Lemma 6.3. If wp has been completed or validated on a non-faulty process Pi, and wp has been
completed on a non-faulty process Pj , then Conti(wp) = Contj(wp).
We have two possible cases: (i) there is a subtree T (g) with less than ⌈t/k⌉ non-validated
processes – call such subtree pivotal ; or (ii) no such tree exists, in which case we apply the completion
rule to R-round values in T (0), and define T (0) as our pivotal subtree instead. A pivotal subtree,
therefore, must exist according to the definition above.
Denote the set of processes in the word w as SetProc(w). For any non-validated wb with
b ∈ P(g) in a pivotal subtree T (g), where 1 ≤ |wb| < R, we establish consensus on Cont(wb). We
apply the consensus rule: Cont(wb) = v if the majority of processes in P(g) \ SetProc(wb) is such
that wbp = v. This rule is applied first to entries labeled wb where |wb| = R− 1, and then moving
upwards (please refer to Alg. 1). Our algorithm is essentially separating the possible chains of
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unknown values across disjoint process groups, which either forces one of these chains to be smaller
than R = ⌈t/k⌉, or reveals all faulty processes, giving us the ability to perform the completion
rule. This fundamental tradeoff underlies our algorithm, and ultimately explains why the ⌈t/k⌉
connectivity bound is tight. Lemma 6.4, proven in Appendix B, shows that the consensus rule
indeed establishes consensus across non-faulty processes that identify T (g) as the pivotal subtree.
Lemma 6.4. For any two-non-faulty processes Pi and Pj that applied the consensus rule on a pivotal
subtree T (g), with 0 ≤ g < k, we have that Conti(p) = Contj(p) for any p ∈ P(g).
Theorem 6.5. Algorithm 1 solves k-set agreement in ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 rounds.
Proof. Termination is trivial, as we execute exactly R = ⌈t/k⌉ + 1 rounds. By Lemma 6.4, each
pivotal subtree yields a unique decision value. As we have at most k pivotal subtrees identified
across non-faulty processes, up to k values are possibly decided across non-faulty processes.
7 Conclusion
In Byzantine synchronous systems, the protocol complex can remain (k − 1)-connected for ⌈t/k⌉
rounds, potentially one more round than in crash-failure systems. We conceive a combinatorial
operator modeling the ability of Byzantine processes to equivocate without revealing their Byzantine
nature, just after ⌊t/k⌋ rounds of crash failures. We compose this operator with the regular crash-
failure operators, extending (k−1)-connectivity up to ⌈t/k⌉ rounds. We tighten this bound, at least
when n is relatively large compared to t, via a full-information protocol that solves a formulation
of k-set agreement.
It may be surprising that Byzantine failures impose only one additional synchronous round
over the crash-failure model, and at most that in our standard setting, where inputs are arbitrarily
attributed to processes, and the number of processes is strictly bigger than k(3t + 1). In terms of
solvability vs. number of rounds, the penalty for moving from crash to Byzantine failures can thus
be quite limited. Previous work has hinted this possibility operationally, since (i) in synchronous
systems where n is large enough compared to t, we can simulate crash failures on Byzantine systems
with a 1-round delay [2]; and (ii) techniques similar to the reliable broadcast of [4, 25] deal with
the problem of Byzantine equivocation, also with a 1-round delay. This extra round is crucial –
but enough – to limit the impact of Byzantine behavior in rather usual operational settings.
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A Appendix: Proofs for the Connectivity Arguments
Proof of Lemma 6.1
Proof. Consider a k-simplex α = {u0, . . . , uk} ⊆ {v0, . . . , vd} with k + 1 different inputs. Let
Iβ = Ψ(P, β) for any β ⊆ α, and Ix =
⋃
β∈skelx(α)Ψ(P, β). We construct a sequence of continuous
maps gx : | skel
x(α)| → |Kx| where K
x is homeomorphic to skelx(α) in | skelx(P(Ix))|.
Base. Let g0 map any vertex v ∈ α to a vertex in Kv = P(I{v}). We know that Kv is
k-connected since dim(I{v}) = dim(I) and P is a k-connected carrier map. We just constructed
g0 : | skel
0(α)| → |K0|,
where K0 is isomorphic to a skel0(α) in | skel0(P(I0))|.
Induction Hypothesis. Assume gx−1 : | skel
x−1(α)| → |Kx−1| for any x ≤ k, where Kx−1 is
isomorphic to skelx−1(α) in | skelx−1(P(Ix−1))|. For any β ∈ skel
x(α), we have that skelx(P(Iβ))
is (x − 1)-connected, hence the continuous image of the (x − 1)-sphere in P(Iβ) can be extended
to the continuous image of the x-disk in skelx(P(Iβ)). We just constructed
gx : | skel
x(α)| → |Kx|,
where Kx is isomorphic to skelx(α) in | skelx(P(I0))|. In the end, we have gk : |α| → |Kk| where Kk
is isomorphic to α in skelk(P(Ik)).
Now suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that k-set agreement is solvable, so there must be a
simplicial map δ : P(I)→ O carried by ∆. Then, induce the continuous map δc : |Kk| → |α| from
δ such that δc(v) ∈ | views(δ(µ))| if v ∈ |µ|, for any µ ∈ Kk. Also, note that the composition of gk
with the continuous map δc induces another continuous map |α| → | ∂ α|, since by assumption δ
never maps a k-simplex of Kk to a simplex with k + 1 different views (so δc never maps a point to
| Intα|). We built a continuous retraction of α to its own border ∂ α, a contradiction (please refer
to [20, 17]). Since our assumption was that there existed a simplicial map δ : P(I)→ O carried by
∆, we conclude that k-set agreement is not solvable.
B Appendix: Proofs for the k-Set Agreement Procedure
Proof of Lemma 6.2.
Proof. If p has been validated on Pi ∈ G, then Conti(wp) = v implies Conti(wpq) = v for (n+1)− t
different processes q ∈ Qi, and Contj(wp) = v implies Contj(wpq) = v for (n + 1) − t different
processes q ∈ Qj, for any 0 ≤ |w| < R. As we have at most t non-faulty processes and n+ 1 > 3t,
|Qi ∩ Qj | ≥ (n + 1) − 2t > t + 1, containing at least one non-faulty process that, by definition,
broadcasts values consistently in its run. Hence, Conti(wp) and Contj(wp) must be identical.
Proof of Lemma 6.3
Proof. If wp has been validated on Pi, Conti(wp) = v implies Conti(wpq) = v for (n+1)−t different
processes q ∈ Q. When Pj applies the completion rule on wp, then Contj(wpq) = v for (n+1)− 2t
different processes q ∈ G, as we have at most t faulty processes. Therefore, Conti(wp) = Contj(wp).
If wp has been completed on all non-faulty processes, they all have identified t faulty processes,
and the completion rule is performed over identical entries associated with non-faulty processes.
Therefore, Conti(wp) = Contj(wp) as well.
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Proof of Lemma 6.4
Proof. Consider a non-faulty process Pi establishing the value of Conti(wp) with the consensus
rule. Define SetCons(wp) = P(g) \ SetProc(wp) for any wp ∈ T (g) with |wp| < R, noting that
|SetCons(wp)| ≥ 2t+ 2 as |P(g)| ≥ 3t+ 1 and |wp| < t.
Consider two cases: (i) if wp has been validated at a non-faulty process Pj with Contj(wp) = v,
at most t values from Si = Multiset(Conti(wpq) : q ∈ SetCons(wp)) will be different than v.
Hence, there will always be a majority of values in Si that will contain v, because |Si| ≥ 2t+2. (ii)
otherwise, if wp has not been validated at any non-faulty process, all Cont(wp) values are being
calculated over consistent values, by Lemma 6.3, which makes all non-faulty processes establish
Cont(wp) consistently with the consensus rule.
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